Morality and Legitimacy of India’s Interventions in East Pakistan & Sri Lanka

Posting the Research Paper that I wrote for my course on "The Politics and Ethics of use of Force at Harvard Kennedy School"

Morality and Legitimacy of India’s Interventions in East Pakistan & Sri Lanka 

Abstract

Humanitarian interventions have always been complex and controversial to analyze from the moral and legal point of view. Such interventions appear to be justified from the moral point of view but there are questions raised about the legality and the actual intent of the intervention. This paper seeks to address the legitimacy and morality of humanitarian interventions by states in the affairs of other states by examining two cases – that of India’s interventions in East Pakistan in 1971 and in Sri Lanka in 1987; and concludes that legitimacy and morality are complex issues as far as humanitarian interventions are concerned. A perfectly legitimate intervention might appear to be unjust and a not so legitimate intervention may prove to be a just example of humanitarian intervention. The Paper examines the circumstances that led to these two interventions. It uses various factors to determine whether the intervention was moral and whether it was legitimate? The paper also examines the role played by the big nations – United States, Russia (Soviet Union), United Kingdom, France and China in the two events. The paper will also examine the internal political situation in India, in particular the strength of determination of the leaders, during the two events that led to the key decisions of intervention.

Humanitarian Interventions and Moral dilemmas

Jennifer Welsh, in his book Humanitarian Intervention and International Relations defines humanitarian intervention as “coercive interference in the internal affairs of a state, involving the use of armed force, with the purposes of addressing massive human rights violations or preventing widespread human suffering.” Since this kind of intervention is in direct confrontation with sovereignty of a State, it has been a topic for moral reflection for many centuries. Historically, interventionism has been justified by referring to religious obligations mentioned in the Biblical texts in Medieval Europe or Hindu teachings, as mentioned in Bhagavad-Gita in ancient India. However, more recently, humanitarian intervention revolves around the concept of universal human rights.

The number of humanitarian interventions has increased post the cold war and very often it has been used to justify military actions that have been undertaken for a different set of reasons. There have been varied reasons to justify the interventions ranging from Somalia, Haiti, Kosovo, Afghanistan and Iraq. A moral “right” or even duty to intervene in other sovereign countries to prevent violations of human rights is increasingly gaining acceptance in the international community, and as a result such a right is being invoked with increased frequency. It does seem to be moral and virtuous to be able to protect human rights for all individuals, even those living outside one's own country. At the same time, this concept does pose real threats to international peace and stability. It impinges upon the principle of inviolable state sovereignty.

Humanitarian Interventions – How Legitimate and How Moral?

Realists have pointed out that the idea of legitimate humanitarian intervention has the potential of opening the way for military interventions for selfish objectives, justified by the pretense of humanitarianism.  Perceptions of right and wrong are always subjective and there are hardly any objective standards to judge the morality of actions in the international sphere. The concept of legitimate humanitarian intervention makes states get worried about interventions from other states, undertaken on selfish grounds but justified on the basis of “acceptable” humanitarian arguments.

The concept of humanitarian intervention is not as morally straightforward as it might appear at first sight. It is a principle that introduces many moral dilemmas. If humanitarian intervention is indeed morally legitimate, as general opinion, might indicate, the question that arises is who is entitled to intervene, and what means can legitimately be used? There is also the question of pre-emption: it would logically seem more moral to intervene before human rights abuses occur, to prevent them, than to intervene after the fact. But can one ever be certain enough about an impending disaster to justify such pre-emption?

Thus there are multiple issues related to humanitarian interventions. The biggest dilemma is of course about legitimacy and morality. The very idea that such interventions are morally just has potentially far-reaching consequences. Today, the accepted norm is that safeguarding of human rights for all people has preference over sovereignty of oppressive regimes. Though it appears to be logical it has ramifications for security and stability of nations.  It has the potential for manipulation by big powers of using acceptable humanitarian arguments to justify the pursuit of selfish objectives. This can render the entire concept of a “right” to humanitarian intervention immoral.

Legitimacy and morality of humanitarian interventions have different connotations.  Legitimacy has two dimensions – one is the concept of legality or lawfulness of whether an action is authorized by law. The other aspect of legitimacy is whether it is in accordance with established or accepted patterns and standards. The legitimacy of a humanitarian intervention can be understood as the way in which the intervention is perceived by the general public. The issues pertaining to legitimacy are different from those relating to morality of an intervention. Another very important factor that determines the legitimacy of any intervention or war is its outcome. Outcome of these interventions is measured in terms of proportionality. The harm caused by the intervention itself should be lesser compared to the human rights violations it seeks to address. The long-term outcome of an intervention determines the legitimacy of the action to a great extent. Propaganda and media hype also play a major role in determining the legitimacy of an intervention. When there is lot of talk of war, the underlying moral questions get lost. Thus legitimacy of an intervention is different from the moral assessment of the intervention. A moral assessment is an analysis of an action based solely on moral criteria. Thus a moral assessment can be a factor in determining legitimacy, but interventions that are only moral, and do not conform to the other requirements of a legitimate action, will not be called legitimate actions. Media or public opinion, on the other hand, plays little or no role in determining the outcome of a moral assessment. On the basis of this kind of analysis, Bo Christoffer Brekke, in his thesis titled Humanitarian Intervention and Just War, concludes that there can be such a thing as a morally just but (as publicly or legally perceived) illegitimate intervention and indeed also such a thing as a morally unjust but (as publicly or legally perceived) legitimate intervention. Furthermore, the degree of military success in itself does not affect the morality of an intervention. However, factors directly affecting the military success, such as the degree of planning and means used can also directly affect an intervention’s moral stature. Studies of the legitimacy of specific humanitarian interventions are thus different in character from studies of the morality of such interventions. While the former might be able to say something about the conditions under which interventions are acceptable to the general public, the latter can give a deeper insight into the moral stature of humanitarian interventions in general, and the conditions under which interventions can be considered morally acceptable or unacceptable on a more fundamental basis.

In this paper, two cases studies are analyzed – 1) India’s Intervention in East Pakistan in 1971, which though was without the authorization of the Security Council, yet proved to be morally just and legitimate and 2) India’s intervention in Sri Lanka which followed an International agreement, but is generally regarded to be morally unjust.

1971, India’s intervention in East Pakistan: Birth of Bangladesh

India’s intervention in 1971 in East Pakistan was unique and remarkable as it was for the first time, after the Second World War, a military intervention by one country into another had led to the formation of a new country. As per the account of the events by BBC , civil war had erupted in Pakistan after East Pakistan demanded autonomy and later independence. The West Pakistan army fought against the East Pakistanis leading to atrocities and killings. This resulted in almost 10 million East Pakistanis to flee to India. In December 1971, India invaded East Pakistan and in a swift 13 day war, almost 90000 soldiers of Pakistani Army surrendered to India. On 16^th December 1971, East Pakistan became the independent country of Bangladesh.

The 1971 war in East Pakistan is one of the few wars that is regarded as a just war. However, it is interesting to see that this war was initiated as a humanitarian intervention but became a full-fledged war when the defense of India was threatened by attacks from West Pakistan.

Background

In order to fully appreciate this war, it is necessary to examine the history of the region. The Indian Subcontinent was partitioned between two nations – India and Pakistan, in 1947 when the British left. India became an independent nation on 15^th August 1947 as a democratic and secular republic in which all people enjoyed right to equality and freedom without any discrimination. Pakistan came into existence a day earlier, on the premise that Hindus and Muslims are two different nationalities and cannot coexist. The Muslim majority provinces of undivided India formed Pakistan and it had two distinct, geographically unconnected units of East Pakistan and West Pakistan. West Pakistan was made up of a number of races including the Punjabis (the most numerous), Sindhis, Pathans, Balochis, Mohajirs (Muslim refugees from India) and others. East Pakistan, on the other hand, was much more homogeneous and had an overwhelming Bengali-speaking population.

The key reason for discord between East Pakistan and West Pakistan was that East Pakistan was more populous but the political power had traditionally remained with West Pakistan resulting in considerable discontent and resentment in people of East Pakistan. Sheikh Mujibur Rehman, a charismatic leader of East Pakistan and his party Awami League demanded more autonomy for East Pakistan. In the 1970 elections, Sheikh’s party got a majority. The Awami League won 165 of the 167 national assembly seats reserved for East Pakistan. The two other seats were won by independents. The PPP won 81 of the seats in West Pakistan to become the leading force there. On a national level, the Awami League was also the single largest party in the 313-seat parliament. Thus Sheikh Mujibur should have become the Prime Minister of Pakistan but General Yahya Khan, who had appointed himself the President in 1969 would not let go of power easily. He along with General Tikka Khan decided to take action against the East Pakistanis. On 25^th March 1971, a major crackdown was ordered which led to killings of thousands of people and arrest of Sheikh Mujibur. There was rebellion in the Army too as many Bengali soldiers and officers decided to support the rebels. The Pakistani army launched Operation Searchlight with the aim of crushing the Bengali nationalist movement by taking control of the major cities and then eliminating all opposition, political or military, within a month. In the crackdown that followed, there was massive loss of civilian life and the killing of defenseless persons was called Genocide by an article by Anthony Mascarenhas in the UK’s Sunday Times that exposed the brutality of Pakistan’s suppression of the uprising in East Pakistan. The article detailed how university students and professors were lined up and executed. It also detailed the selective killings of the leaders of Awami league and members of intelligentsia. The number of people killed ranged between 500,000 to a million. It also led to an influx of almost 10 million refugees in India. This was turning out to be a huge humanitarian crisis.

According to the report of the International Commission of Jurists:

“The principal features of this ruthless oppression were the indiscriminate killing of civilians, including women and children and the poorest and weakest members of the community; the attempt to exterminate or drive out of the country a large part of the Hindu population; the arrest, torture and killing of Awami league activists, students, professional and businessmen and other potential leaders…; the raping of women; the destruction of villages and towns; and the looting of property. All this was done on a scale which is difficult to comprehend”.

India made repeated appeals to the international community for intervention but there was no response. India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi felt that the only solution was in helping the Bengali freedom fighters, especially the Mukti Bahini, to liberate East Pakistan, which had already been re-christened as Bangladesh by its people. The morale of Mukti Bahini was boosted with the possibilities of support from Indian forces. However, India was finding it difficult to intervene only on the humanitarian cause as there was very little support for it, especially from the US.

General Yahya Khan feared that India’s entry would mean sure shot defeat. In one of the most miscalculated moves, he launched preemptive strikes on Indian air force bases on 3^rd December with an objective of neutralizing Indian Air Force. However, India had anticipated this and this attack amounted to an open act of unprovoked aggression which gave India’s the right to intervene in self - defense.

Pakistan made urgent appeals to the United Nations to intervene and force India to agree to a ceasefire. The UN Security Council met on 4 December 1971 to discuss the situation. After lengthy discussions, on 7 December, the United States put forward a resolution for an "immediate ceasefire and withdrawal of troops". Russia vetoed the resolution twice. Britain and France abstained, primarily on account of the atrocities committed by Pakistani army.

The Pakistani forces in East Pakistan were outnumbered by Indian army and fighters of Mukti Vahini. Some Military historians feel that the probable strategy of Pakistan was to focus on India’s West and capture as much territory as possible since defeat in East was certain before a UN mandated ceasefire will establish status quo. The Indian army quickly overran the country and the Pakistanis surrendered on 16 December 1971, the largest surrender since the Second World War. Bangladesh sought admission to the UN with most voting in its favour, but China vetoed this as Pakistan was its key ally, as was the United States, which was one of the last nations to accord Bangladesh recognition.

The geopolitical stage

The response of various world leaders and nations was very interesting. US President Richard Nixon regarded the rebellion in East Pakistan as an internal matter of Pakistan and claimed that he would not get involved. However, his administration gave political and material support to General Yahya Khan. Nixon and his national security advisor Henry Kissinger feared the expansion of Russian influence in South Asia as Russia was an ally of India. US administration felt that an Indian invasion of West Pakistan would undermine the global position of the US. Nixon was also negotiating a rapprochement with China and felt that an Indian invasion would undermine the regional position of China also. Nixon also had planned to visit China in February 1972. US send military supplies to Pakistan by routing through Iran and Jordan which was in violation of the sanctions imposed by US Congress on Pakistan. China was in any way supplying arms to Pakistan.

This act of the Nixon administration of ignoring the reports it received of the atrocities and genocide being committed by the Pakistani army in East Pakistan was most notably documented in the infamous ‘Blood telegram’ sent by US diplomat, Archer Blood, on 6 April 1971 that highlighted the atrocities during the liberation war. In the dissent telegram, Blood accused the Nixon administration of being "morally bankrupt". The 'Blood Telegram' marked the first time a whole U.S mission had dissented from their own government.

The declassification of documents of the 1971 war between India and Pakistan have also established the fact of the absolute tilt of US President Nixon and Kissinger against India. There is a very interesting story of the private breakfast meeting of Henry Kissinger with Indira Gandhi in July 1971, in which Mrs. Gandhi had asked Chief of Indian Army, General Manekshaw to attend in uniform.

At that meeting Mrs. Indira Gandhi was persistent in asking Kissinger that US should restrain Pakistan from doing what was being done in East Pakistan. Kissinger, however, went on prevaricating and would not really give a straight answer. After repeated requests, Mrs. Gandhi was quite rattled and she stood up and pointing towards the General (who was in full military uniform) told Kissinger that “if the US Government and US President cannot control the situation then I am going to ask him (meaning the General) to do the same”.

Soviet Union (Russia) supported the Indian army and Mukti Bahini during the war. For them, the independence of Bangladesh would weaken the position of its global and regional rivals. The Indo-Soviet friendship treaty was signed in August 1971 which gave India assurances that, if a confrontation with the US or China developed, Russia would take countermeasures in favour of India.

With the defeat of Pakistan almost certain, Nixon sent the aircraft carrier, USS Enterprise, to the Bay of Bengal on 11^th December 1971. This led to escalation of nuclear tensions in the region. In response, the Russian navy dispatched two groups of ships, armed with nuclear missiles, from Vladivostok on 13^th December 1971.

At the end of the war, the Warsaw Pact countries of Central and Eastern Europe were among the first to recognize Bangladesh. Soviet Union accorded recognition to Bangladesh on 25 January 1972. The United States eventually did so in April. On 2 July 1972, the Shimla accord was signed between India and Pakistan, with the objective of normalizing relations between India and Pakistan, including the return of Pakistani prisoners of war. Pakistan officially recognized Bangladesh in 1974.

Was it a Humanitarian Intervention?

India’s intervention in East Pakistan leading to the creation of Bangladesh is regarded as a legitimate humanitarian intervention when viewed from the legal conditions required for a valid humanitarian intervention. The intervention was unilateral as the same was not authorized by Security Council. India’s act provided assistance to the people of East Pakistan who were engaged in a struggle for their right to self-determination. The intervention helped end the ongoing genocide which was severe, flagrant and widespread. The intervention did get considerable International support and The Security Council Resolution 307 adopted after the fall of Dacca did not condemn India as an aggressor or even imply such condemnation. The Resolution called for ‘respect of cessation of hostilities’ and ‘withdrawal of troops as soon as possible.

In view of the above, and because similar situations are emerging the world over, it is interesting to look at what constitutes a Humanitarian intervention. As we know Humanitarian intervention is a controversial subject in international law as it is not provided for in the UN Charter. As per the UN, any use of force must be authorized by the Security Council or should be in cases of self-defense only. In the case of Bangladesh, India was prepared for making a humanitarian intervention without meeting these two criteria; however, it was helped by the act of aggression of Pakistan making the intervention a just act of war.

Holzgrefe defines Humanitarian Intervention as “the use of force across state borders by a state (or group of states) aimed at preventing or ending widespread and grave violations of the fundamental human rights of individuals other than its own citizens, without the permission of the government of the state within whose territory, force is applied.”

As per the definition given by Holzgrefe, the intervention by India in East Pakistan will qualify to be a humanitarian intervention as it was primarily to stop the genocide and atrocities being perpetrated by the Pakistani army against the civilians in East Pakistan.

Teson, in his book, Humanitarian Intervention: An Inquiry into Law and Morality  defines humanitarian intervention as “Proportionate help, including forcible help provided by governments (individually or in alliances) to individuals in another state who are victims of severe tyranny… or anarchy”

As per this definition also, the intervention by India in extending support to Mukti Vahini, which represented the people of East Pakistan, subjected to oppression and torture by the Pakistani Army, qualified as just and legitimate humanitarian intervention. The use of force by India was proportional as the intent was not to capture territory but to ensure stopping of the genocide and atrocities.

The legal basis of humanitarian interventions is also recognized by Classical International Law. Hugo Grotius, the famous Dutch jurist who laid down the foundations of international law based on natural law regarded humanitarian intervention as one of the just causes of war. As per him:

“the fact must also be recognized that kings and those who possess rights equal to those of kings, have the right of demanding punishments not only on account of injuries committed against themselves or their subjects, but also on account of injuries which do not directly affect them but excessively violate the law of nature or of nations in regard to any persons whatsoever.”

Thus as per the doctrine of Grotius, India was justified in undertaking war on behalf of the citizens of East Pakistan in order to protect them from the oppression and tyranny as the actions of Pakistani army did violate the laws of nature in inflicting excessive harm to citizens of East Pakistan and violating their human rights.

Even John Stuart Mill, who stoutly defended the doctrine of nonintervention, still recognized certain exceptions which included interventions to assist victims of authoritarian and tyrannous governments.

Thus there has been a case of humanitarian interventions regarded as legitimate and just interventions. This position was summarized beautifully by Oppenheim as:

“there is a general agreement that, by virtue of its personal and territorial supremacy, a state can treat its own nationals according to discretion. But there is a substantial body of opinion and of practice in support of the view that there are limits to that discretion and that when a state renders itself guilty of cruelties and persecution of its nationals in such a way as to deny their fundamental human rights and to shock the conscience of mankind, intervention in the interest of humanity is legally permissible..”

Simon Chesterman also was of a similar opinion and in his book, Just War or Just Peace,  analyses the issue of whether states have the right to intervene in foreign civil conflicts for humanitarian reasons. The UN Charter prohibits state aggression, but he argues that such a right exists as an exception to this rule. As per him the right to humanitarian intervention exists in parallel with the UN Charter.

Thus it is established that humanitarian intervention was considered legal as per the classical international law before the UN Charter came in force. Thus there is no dispute to the fact that India’s intervention in East Pakistan was ethical, legitimate and justified. In India’s case the prime reason was the influx of refugees affecting the demographics of key Indian states.

India’s intervention in Sri Lanka in 1987

While India’s intervention in East Pakistan was fully legitimate and a resounding success resulting in creation of Bangladesh as an independent nation, 16 years later, India had to intervene in another neighboring nation, Sri Lanka, albeit at the invitation of the Sri Lankan Government, but this intervention turned out to be much different than what was planned. The intervention in Sri Lanka followed the Indo Sri Lanka Accord of 1987 signed between the Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Gandhi and Sri Lankan President Jayewardene.  Accordingly, the Indian Peace Keeping Forces (IPKF) were initially deployed to ensure implementation of the Accord and were more for maintaining Peace. However, very soon, Indian forces got embroiled in counter insurgency operations against the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), the Tamil separatist forces, for which the forces were not prepared.

At the same time there was opposition within Sri Lanka on the continued Indian presence leading to Sri Lankan government, led by President Ranasinghe Premadasa, asking India to quit the Island. It is also alleged that Sri Lanka entered into a secret deal with the LTTE that resulted in a ceasefire. LTTE and IPKF continued to have hostilities. T D S A Dissanayake in his book, War or Peace in Sri Lanka, claims that the Sri Lankan government even armed the rebels in order to make the Indian forces leave. With rising casualties of IPKF personnel, there was an increased demand for withdrawal of the forces from both within India and Sri Lanka. After the Indian parliamentary elections in 1989, the new government led by Prime Minister V P Singh ordered the withdrawal of the forces and by March 1990, all Indian forces had left Sri Lanka.

The IPKF adventure proved to be a tactful mistake on part of India as it led to not only the killing of thousands of Indian soldiers but also resulted in the assassination of Rajiv Gandhi in May 1991 by LTTE cadres. It led to the end of the support provided by Indian Government to LTTE and initiated increased cooperation with Sri Lankan government to defeat the Tamil Tigers.

The question that arises is whether the intervention by Indian forces was just and ethical? It would not qualify as a humanitarian intervention as it was following an agreement with the Sri Lankan government and the objective was not to end genocide or oppression of a group of people or community.

Background

The genesis of the problem lies in the attack by the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE), in July 1983 that resulted in a strong backlash against Sri Lankan Tamils by the

Sinhalese - dominated Sri Lankan state. These events referred to as Black July, marked the beginning of full-scale ethnic conflict that would impact the island nation for a long time. Given the large Tamil population in India and the close ties of certain political parties with the LTTE, India had a stake in the Sri Lankan strife.

S D Muni in his book Pangs of Proximity identifies two main factors that led to India’s involvement in Sri Lanka. As per him the main factor was Sri Lanka’s effective engagement of countries inimical to India’s security interests and pushing for a military solution to crush the rebels. The second factor was a demand by India’s own Tamil population to act on behalf of the Sri Lankan Tamils. India had around 50 million Tamil population that time and India’s Prime Minister Indira Gandhi, could not have avoided getting involved in the matter as a regional power and close neighbor.

The strategy adopted by India was a multi- pronged one. On one hand it encouraged talks between the Sri Lankan government and Tamil leadership (with TULF – Tamil United Liberation Front and not LTTE), resulting in proposals for the devolution of power - a key demand of the moderate Tamils. At the same time, India voiced strong concern and sympathy for the sufferings of Sri Lankan Tamils. This led to a perception in the Sinhalese Sri Lankans that India was prejudiced against the Sri Lankan state.

Several political parties of Tamilnadu, the southern Indian state with Tamil population were sympathetic to the LTTE and Chief Ministers like M G Ramachandran and Karunanidhi allowed setting up of training camps for LTTE cadres.  During the same period, it has been alleged that India’s external intelligence agency, the Research and Analysis Wing (RAW), began supplying Tamil militant groups with military training, cash, and arms in an attempt to draw them under India’s influence and to use that influence as leverage against the Sri Lankan state.

After the assassination of Indira Gandhi, Rajiv Gandhi took over as the Prime Minister of India and this marked a shift in India’s policy. The new policy was more aligned to Sri Lankan priorities and supported political talks and devolution of power after cessation of violence. Indian Navy started patrolling the Palk Straits along with the Sri Lankan navy and came in direct conflict with the Tamil rebels. This failed to resolve the ethnic crisis and Sri Lanka also didn’t take any action for granting political autonomy to Tamil regions. After failed talks in Thimpu in 1985, Sri Lankan government launched a military offensive against the Tamil militants by targeting Jaffna Peninsula leading to a Humanitarian crisis.

Operation Poomalai – India’s humanitarian intervention

In wake of the humanitarian crisis facing Jaffna, India decided to intervene and sent relief supplies by boat which Sri Lanka turned away. This made India to launch Operation Poomalai – dropping “bread bombs” as relief packages in Jaffna by Indian Air Force planes. This humanitarian intervention was criticized by many as it impinged on Sri Lanka’s sovereignty. India claimed that it was with the objective of limiting Tamil suffering at the hands of the Sri Lankan government. This humanitarian intervention led to India getting a bigger role in resolving the ethnic crisis in Sri Lanka. This led to Sri Lankan President J. R. Jayewardene, to initiate talks with Rajiv Gandhi, resulting in the signing of the Indo-Sri Lankan Accord on 29 July 1987. It was not clear if LTTE was in favor of the Accord. Under the terms of the Accord, the Sri Lankan government agreed to make constitutional changes for devolving powers which was the key demand of the moderate Tamils. In return, India was to ensure arms-collection from the rebel groups. India’s role primarily became that of a guarantor of peace. The LTTE however, laid down arms only briefly and launched attacks again. The IPKF had to confront the LTTE rebels and very soon Indian forces, originally sent for peace keeping operations got involved in major military operations against LTTE. This led to heavy casualties of Indian soldiers. All this resulted in resentment and mistrust on all sides – India, Sri Lanka and LTTE. Ultimately with change of power in both countries, IPKF was forced to withdraw from Sri Lanka.

Conclusions

The intervention by India in Sri Lanka proved to be a failure as against that in East Pakistan primarily because it did not meet the test of legitimate humanitarian interventions. The dilemma is that the East Pakistan intervention was without the authorization of the Security Council whereas the one in Sri Lanka was a consequence of an International agreement. Thus Sri Lanka seems to be theoretically more legitimate and just as compared to East Pakistan. The practical perception is exactly opposite. The Sri Lankan episode is regarded to be unethical and unjustified wherein Indian forced ended up fighting the very Tamils whom they had sought to protect initially. It was such a disaster that analysts regard this episode as India’s Vietnam. Thus we find that a perfectly legal intervention, like the one in Sri Lanka may appear to be unjust and illegitimate while a not so legitimate intervention, like the one in East Pakistan may become one of the classic examples of Just and Legitimate interventions.